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SPRING 1963]
in cases like the present one (since such extreme steps were contemplated
by the defendant here), it might very well be significant in cases such as
those involving picketing and boycotting.
Arthur B. Morgenstern
PRIVILEGE-EXTENSION OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO
CORPORATIONS.
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n (N.D. Ill. 1962)
City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. (E.D. Pa. 1962)
In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n,' it was held that
a plea invoking the attorney-client privilege was not available to a corpo-
ration as a defense to a request by a plaintiff for certain documents. In
City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,2 it was stated that the
attorney-client privilege could be pleaded by a corporation in answer to a
request by a complainant for information obtained by the company's
general counsel in the course of an investigation of facts relating to a
pending indictment of the corporation.
In general, the attorney-client privilege may be defined thus: "(1)
where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
adviser (8) except the protection be waived." The purpose of the privi-
lege is to remove any inhibition a client might have to disclose all the
pertinent facts to his attorney lest the latter be forced subsequently to
reveal these communications. Considering for a moment only the in-
tent of the privilege and the problem it was intended to rectify there
can be little doubt that a corporate being comes logically within its scope.
Certainly, a corporation, as well as an individual, needs such protection to
insure full disclosure; a corporation benefits no less than a natural person
from legitimate legal assistance.'
Historically, of course, the privilege was extended only to communi-
cations between a legal adviser and a natural person. However, this dis-
tinction between a natural being and a legal entity has, of itself, little
1. 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962). For discussion of this case, see Note, 4
B. C. IND. & CoM. L. Rev. 416 (1963) and Note, 57 Nw. U. L. Rev. 596 (1962).
2. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
3. 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughten rev. 1961). The distinction
between the attorney-client privilege and the work-product privilege of the attorney
should be kept in mind.
4. Cf. Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege As Applied to Corporations, 65
YALE L.J. 953, 955 (1956).
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validity today. This dichotomy has been abandoned for many purposes.5
Weighing, especially, the corporation's need of the protection in the
modern business world, this elready weakened distinction should not be
placed as a critical obstacle. However, a further and related restriction
which has been traditionally imposed is not so easily dispelled. The parties
invoking the privilege have always been obliged to show that all com-
munications were made in an atmosphere of secrecy and confidence. 6
If disclosure were made in the presence of a third party, the protection
was lost. Because the corporate entity is composed of many individuals,
the difficulties in meeting this test may seem to be increased. In fact,
in the present Radiant Burners case, it was suggested that this require-
ment be dropped regarding corporations, although it was admitted that
this was a task for the legislature.7 However, such a drastic change may
not be necessary. Even at common law, communications made to an attorney
by an agent of the client were given the same privileged status as statements
made directly by the principal to the adviser.s The corporation-agent
relation seems closely analogous to that of principal and agent. Thus, even
if it were not conceded that more than one individual could exist as the
corporation-client, it could very persuasively be argued that certain em-
ployees were valid agents of the corporation and entitled to the coverage of
the privilege. This principal-agent exception to the traditional rule of
strict confidentiality points up the rationale behind the requirement itself.
It was assumed that if a disinterested third party were given access
to the information he would be free to disclose at will what he had
learned. In such a case, the privilege which demands non-disclosure would
be useless. On the other hand, an agent of the client was presumably
not free to make such disclosures. Certainly, at least a director or an
officer is under a duty to his corporation not to promulgate informa-
tion revealed in confidence. In fact, he has a definite interest in pre-
serving the secrecy of such information. In any event, whatever may be
the logical reasons for rejecting a strict interpretation of the confidentiality
requirement in regard to corporations, it appears that an overwhelming
5. It should be noted, however, that a corporation cannot invoke the privilege
of refusing to give self-incriminating evidence. In this regard, it has been said:
"This particular privilege [i.e., the attorney-client privilege] should not be denied
them merely because of their power, wealth, or quasi-public position, since - unlike
the privilege against self-incrimination, which they do not enjoy - it is not
intended as a shield to the weak, but rather as an encouragement to all, strong and
weak alike, to consult freely with counsel." Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege
As Applied to Corporations, supra note 4 at 955.
6. United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 821, 79 S. Ct. 33 (1958); Pollock v. United States, 202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 993, 73 S. Ct. 1133 (1953). See also 8 WIGmoRn, EVIDENCE§ 2311 (McNaughton rev. 1961) :
No express request for secrecy, to be sure, is necessary. But the mere relation
of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality, and the
circumstances are to indicate whether by implication the communication was
of the sort intended to be confidential. These circumstances will of course vary
in individual cases, and the ruling must therefore depend much on the case in hand.
7. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, supra note 1 at 323-24.
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number of courts have implicitly done so.9 Also, it is interesting to note
that both the Uniform Rules of Evidence' 0 and the Model Code of
Evidence" have granted the corporation the status of client.
Even assuming that a corporation is considered a "client," there is
still left unsolved the problem suggested in the above discussion of the
corporate agent, namely, the scope of the privilege within the corporate
structure. Since a corporation acts only through its representatives, some-
one must be allowed to speak on its behalf without such disclosures
being considered third party statements. However, if all disclosures
made on behalf of a corporation are considered privileged, the privilege
would extend far beyond that allowed to an individual. 12 Several views
have been posed regarding the allowable breadth of the privilege. In
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,'3 the court did not seem
to place any limitation upon which agents or employees could act as
spokesmen for the corporation. 14 The court reasoned that since the client
was the corporation, a disclosure by a corporate employee to an attorney
for the purpose of obtaining legal assistance for the company was privi-
leged. Under such a broad approach, it would appear that even the
lowliest corporate employee would have access to the corporation's privi-
lege.
9. E.g., Stewart Equipment Co. v. Gallo, 32 N.J. Super. 15, 17, 107 A.2d 527,
528 (1954), where the court stated: "Since a corporation can only act through its
agent, it must necessarily follow that if the attorney-client privilege is to extend to
corporations, as it does, it must necessarily extend to confidential communica-
tions made by the agent of the corporation." Zenith Radio v. Radio Corp. of America,
121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954). Cf. Klein, Attorney-Client Privilege and Corpora-
tions, 12 CLEVE.-MAR. L. REv. 95, 96 (1962), for a collection of cases assuming the
privilege.
10. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE § 26(3)
As used in this rule (a) 'Client' means a person or corporation or other
association that, directly or through an authorized representative, consults a
lawyer or the lawyer's representative for the purpose of retaining the lawyer or
securing legal service or advice from him in his professional capacity.
11. MODEL CODE oF EVIDENcE rule 209 (1942) :
(a) Client means a person or corporation or other association that, directly
or through an authorized representative, consults a lawyer or the lawyer's
representative for the purpose of retaining the lawyer or securing legal service
from him in his professional capacity.
(b) Holder of the privilege.
(ii) if the client is a corporation or other association, means the
corporation or other association until its existence as such is terminated.
12. Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege As Applied to Corporations, supra
note 4 at 956.
13. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
14. The court set out the following guides:
The privilege applies only if: (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or
sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was
made (a) is the member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in
connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communica-
tion relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client
(b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily
either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some
legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort;
and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
89 F. Supp. at 358-59.
Cf. Note, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, The
Role of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U. L. Rtv. 235, 241 (1961).
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In the present City of Philadelphia case, the court limited the privi-
lege to statements made on behalf of a corporation by one in a decision
making position. The test was whether "the employee making the
communication, of whatever rank he may be, is in a position to control
or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which
the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he is an
authorized member of a body or group which has that authority . . ."5
The court added that ". . . it is implicit in the foregoing that the au-
thority of the person speaking with the lawyer to participate in con-
templated decisions must be actual authority."' 0 It seems apparent that
the court in United Shoe would also have required at least actual au-
thority. Although it might be argued that since the corporation, as such,
is the client, everyone comprising the corporate entity should be cloaked
with the privilege, it is certainly questionable whether an appellate court
would permit such a sweeping characterization. The approach of the
court in the City of Philadelphia case, in the other hand, seems
eminently more realistic. The purpose of the privilege is to insure the
client the benefit of his attorney's advice based on a full disclosure of all
relevant facts so that the former may best decide his course of action.
Since, viewed in this light, the object of the privilege is the ultimate
decision and activity of the client, in the case of a corporation it should
be limited to the communications between the attorney and those who
are in a position to make such decisions.1 7 Certainly, all corporate em-
ployees would not be so included and, in the case of a large publicly held
company, probably not even many of the stockholders. Whether a state-
ment made by a specific employee was within the scope of the privilege
would be determined by a reference to the particular facts of each case
as to what influence and position the employee exerted in the company.
However, such an analysis does not solve the problem of when the
privilege is violated. In a large modern corporation, any significant
report will be the product of the combined skills of many employees. The
necessary disclosures involved in this process should not be sufficient
to dissolve the privilege. Possibly, such disclosures would fall under the
traditional exemption of statements made to persons who must neces-
sarily be involved. Also, in such a situation the intent of the parties
would probably reveal a desire to retain secrecy. Similarly, although dis-
closures might be made to certain corporate employees who are not in
a decision-making position, for instance, technicians and other skilled
personnel, this should not necessarily raise a presumption that an intent
15. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., supra note 2 at 485.
This test has been adopted in Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515
(S.D. Cal. 1963).
16. Ibid.
17. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 251, 253
(N.D.N.Y. 1960), it was declared: "I know of no authority which would hold that
the privilege is lost because one executive in a corporation discloses to another such
executive the factual information which he has given to counsel upon which to base
a legal opinion. The document is privileged."
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